Civil Code and Related Subjects: Successions and Donations by Daggett, Harriet S.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 15 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1953-1954 Term
February 1955
Civil Code and Related Subjects: Successions and
Donations
Harriet S. Daggett
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Harriet S. Daggett, Civil Code and Related Subjects: Successions and Donations, 15 La. L. Rev. (1955)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol15/iss2/7
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
any tacit dedication of the street in question. However, in the
presence of the three necessary elements: (1) use by the pub-
lic, (2) maintenance by the municipality, and (3) acquiescence
(consent) of the proprietor, there was held to be a tacit dedi-
cation. Despite the logic and reasoning, it is not hard to under-
stand the plaintiff's displeasure when, in addition to all that
had already happened, he found paving liens and assessments
recorded against his property for the further improvement of
this street. Nevertheless, even if it is unavoidable to heap all
these misfortunes upon the poor proprietor, is it also necessary
to inflict upon our civil law the description of an implied dedi-
cation in terms of a common law "estoppel in pais"?
In Mecobon v. Police Jury5 an alleged dedication failed
for lack of evidence concerning intent to dedicate, and because
there did not appear to be such a use for public purposes as
would exclude the idea of private ownership.
In addition to the property cases here discussed, there were
a number of cases on expropriation, 16 which is treated in the
Civil Code as a forced sale rather than as a property matter.
The dispute usually centers on either the extent and value of
the land to be taken, the location of the right of way, or, most
frequently, the amount of compensation. Another group of





In Bierhorst v. Kelly" the court held that Articles 76, 77, 78,
and 79, dealing with rights falling to an absentee after he de-
15. 224 La. 793, 70 So.2d 687 (1954).
16. City of Shreveport v. Abe Meyer Corp., 223 La. 1079, 67 So.2d 732
(1953); Louisiana Rural Electric Corp. v. Guillory, 224 La. 73, 68 So.2d 762
(1953); Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission v. Watson, 224 La. 136, 68
So.2d 901 (1953); Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Brinkman, 224 La.
262, 69 So.2d 37 (1953); Calcasieu & S. Ry. v. Bel, 224 La. 269, 69 So.2d 40
(1953); Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Boudwine, 224 La. 988, 71
So.2d 541 (1954).
17. Art. 2626 et seq., LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
18. New Orleans v. Doll, 224 La. 1046, 71 So.2d 562 (1954); Cortinas v.
Murray, 224 La. 686, 70 So.2d 589 (1954); Housing Authority of New Orleans
v. Banks, 224 La. 172, 69 So.2d 5 (1953); Knapp v. Jefferson-Plaquemines
Drainage Dist., 224 La. 105, 68 So.2d 774 (1953).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 74 So.2d 168 (La. 1954).
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parts, clearly indicate that property going to designated persons
under Article 77 gives possession only and not ownership. The
word "proceeds" in Article 79 is said to mean fruits and reve-
nues rather than consideration received from a sale. The mean-
ing of the word "proceeds" in Article 73 is clearly the latter,
the protection given the reappearing absentee after heirs have
been placed in absolute possession which gives the right of
sale. Thus, the instant case must decide that only provisional
possession is intended under Article 77. Under this analysis it
would seem unnecessary to distinguish between property held
by the individual when he departs and that which may fall to
him thereafter, if the results are to be the same.
Cases upon which the lower court relied apparently for the
decision which would have made title merchantable under either
an ownership or absolute possession theory were said to be dis-
tinguishable. It would seem that absolute possession with power
to alienate would be more in keeping with the whole series of
articles on absentees and with the general policy against hold-
ing.2
In Succession of Gladney3 the previous attitude of our courts
toward United States bonds was maintained, namely, that own-
ership as directed by the federal contract is conclusive but that
in order to protect Louisiana's laws of inheritance and com-
munity property, an action against the holder may in proper
cases be granted an estate or heir. An excellent resum6 of for-
mer Louisiana decisions on the subject is given in the opinion,
cases which have been previously discussed in this Journal.
In Succession of Williams4 Article 915, giving a usufruct of
the deceased's share in the community to the surviving spouse
in an intestate succession, was properly held inapplicable to a
person adopted during a previous marriage. The article specifi-
cally mentions children of the marriage during which the com-
munity in question was acquired.
In Succession of Thompson5 the court decided that a mother
who had formally acknowledged her child" should inherit from
the deceased child in preference to the latter's husband. Articles
2. Note also La. Acts 1948, No. 343, p. 833, shortening the period for legal
presumption of death.
3. 223 La. 949, 67 So.2d 547 (1953).
4. 224 La. 871, 71 So.2d 229 (1954).
5. 224 La. 995, 71 So.2d 544 (1954).
6. Art. 203, LA. CvuL CODE of 1870.
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dealing with irregular successions are discussed, notably Articles
922 and 924. The court's elevation of the status of the child from
illegitimate to natural is heartening and might some day assist
in actually taking the unfortunate out of the illegitimate class.
It is clear that the opinion disposes of the separate property of
the deceased as indicated above. The case was remanded for
determination of what part of the estate was community, the
indication being that the husband would receive it under Article
915. Since the court has previously decided that the word "de-
scendants" includes natural children, it might have been thought
that perhaps "mother" includes natural mothers. The modern
idea of social justice certainly comprehends every effort to
lighten the burden of the illegitimate child, here without his
consent. That the mother "by whose fault it happened" in part
at least should be rewarded seems somewhat doubtful in a sit-
uation particularly where previous jurisprudence must be over-
ruled and commentators of another country and another age
consulted. The dissenting Justice's remarks in this connection
are most pertinent and convincing.
In Succession of Wesley 7 the court, after thorough review
of authorities, most logically held that the widow of deceased
inherited his separate property rather than the legitimate daugh-
ter of his illegitimate mother. The entire series of articles deal-
ing with irregular successions would seem to bear out the con-
clusion.
In Lee v. Jones8 it was decided that regular heirs accepting
a succession or for whom the law has accepted may successfully
plead the prescription of thirty years against those heirs who
have done nothing during this period allowed by Article 1030.
Various interpretations of this troublesome article have been
so fully and repeatedly discussed by court and commentators
that further laboring of the questions would be tedious.9
Whether the analysis and decision of the instant case satisfy
individual readers or not, perhaps the problem may be con-
sidered settled which is desirable.
The Succession of Gomez'0 is one of the most interesting
and important of the series. Over some fifteen years a mother
had given a daughter monthly sums of money. These sums
7. 224 La. 182, 69 So.2d 8 (1953).
8. 224 La. 231, 69 So.2d 26 (1953).
9. Comment, 14 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 866 (1954).
10. 223 La. 859, 67 So.2d 156 (1953).
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were said to have been given manually. It was argued that they
were thus exempt from collation under Article 1245 and the
court held that under the circumstances of this case, these gifts
did not fall within the intent of exemption of the article. The
analysis and discussion is most informative but will not be
reviewed here as it has been given previously in this Journal."
In Succession of Nelson'2 suit was brought by forced heirs
to set aside as simulated an act of sale and a giving in payment
made separately by their father and mother to a son-in-law.
Evidence disclosed that consideration was given in both cases,
even if inadequate and thus the transactions were not simula-
tions. The vendee was not a forced heir and thus Article 2444
was inapplicable as was the collation plea. As to any balance
that might have been owing, the heirs could not collect as ten
years had expired after the transactions before the parents died.
DONATIONS
In Succession of Reynolds'8 an olographic will was found
valid in form, uncertainty of date having been the sole issue
raised. At the top of the will a superimposed date was found
which rendered the original date indecipherable, and which
was later than the clear date found at the end of the will. After
an interesting survey of the certainty of date question as found
in the jurisprudence and elsewhere, the matter was resolved as
indicated.
In Succession of Nunley 14 a will in olographic form having
been lost, a transcription retained in the attorney's office was
admitted to probate. The court stated that the presumption of
revocation by destruction was a rebuttable one and the evidence
was ample to show that a valid will had been confected, that its
contents were known and that it had not been revoked.
In Succession of Bush" a nuncupative will by private act
was upheld as having been proved by proponent to be the very
document executed by the testator; to have been in compliance
with all formalities set forth by Articles 1581 and 1582; to have
been signed by all witnesses in presence of each other, whether
that was absolutely necessary or not. The attorney named was
11. Note, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 295 (1953).
12. 224 La. 731, 70 So.2d 665 (1953).
13. 224 La. 975, 71 So.2d 537 (1954).
14. 224 La. 251, 69 So.2d 33 (1953).
15. 223 La. 1008, 67 So.2d 573 (1953).
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held not a legatee in the sense of making him an improper wit-
ness.'0 No manual presentation was necessary, the testator
having stated in answer to the notary's question, that the will
was his.
In Succession of Prejean17 a codicil in nuncupative by pub-
lic act form was attacked on several grounds, all of which were
found invalid. Undue influence is expressly denied by Article
1492. Mental incapacity was not proved. The procedures fol-
lowed by the notary were not proved to have been incorrect.' 8
Words suggested by the notary to express properly the inten-
tion of the testator were permissible.' 9
In Succession of Johnson2O the court again pointed out the
difference between a prohibited substitution under Article 1520
and a fidei commissum. The text of the will follows:
"New Orleans, La.
"Nov. 2 - 51
"To whom may consern
"I, Thomas Johnson do make this my Will and do here
by leave evything to my wife Sue W. Johnson as long as
she live and then she is to leave-her step son Robert Thomas
Johnson just 14 of the Share of what is left-and Martha
Jane my only Daughter the rest. At my death Sue W. John-
son shall be the admistor of this will in my own writing at
3 P.M. Nov. - 2-51
"(s) Thomas Johnson"21
The court found title to be immediately vested in decedent's
wife and that she was only asked to give the children what was
left when she died-not to preserve the whole and pass it on
as instructed. Thus, no prohibited substitution was found which
would have nullified the entire bequest. The words indicating
his desires regarding what might be "left" were but precatory.
An additional point of interest said not to have been previously
passed upon by the Supreme Court was the appointment of the
person named in the will as "administrator" as "executor" as
the decedent's intention was clear and should not be vitiated by
16. Art. 1592, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
17. 224 La. 921, 71 So.2d 328 (1954).
18. Art. 1647, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
19. Art. 1578, LA. CIVIL CODR of 1870.
20. 223 La. 1058, 67 So.2d 591 (1953).
21. Id. at 1065, 67 So.2d at 594.
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virtue of his having merely used the wrong word. Thus, the
court under 1041 would not gain the power of appointment of
one who was to take charge of the affairs of the estate.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
The Louisiana Civil Code is clear to the point that assent
to a contract may be express or implied.' In the latter case
consent may be manifested either by actions or, in some cir-
cumstances, by silence or inaction. As an example the Code
provides that to receive goods from a merchant without any
express promise, and to use them, implies a contract to pay the
value. This basic principle was applied in Bascle v. Perez,2
where the defendant was held bound to pay the reasonable value
of services rendered for him by the plaintiff, the compensation
not having been fixed by the agreement. Relying on a series
of earlier cases, the court observed that this disposition of the
case was controlled by the moral maxim of the law that no
one ought to enrich himself at the expense of another. Actually,
when services are rendered and received with the expectation
of payment the recipient impliedly agrees to pay their reason-
able value. A judgment for such amount is therefore simply
an enforcement of the agreement and reliance on a theory of
unjust enrichment is unnecessary.
In Lafleur v. Brown3 the court held that an action for dam-
ages sustained in consequence of defendant's failure to deepen
a well and to install properly a pump therein was contractual.
It therefore overruled a plea of one-year prescription based on
the mistaken theory that the action was in tort. Although some
allegations of the petition gave color to the defendant's position,
the petition as a whole amply supported the contrary conclu-
sion.
The case of Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co. v. Saint Denis Se-
curities Co.4 that involved a claim for damages for breach of
a contract to sell real estate was lost by the plaintiff's failure
to show his acceptance of an offer made by the defendant.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Arts. 1811, 1816, 1817, 1818, LA. CIv CODD of 1870. But see Art. 1766,
LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
2. 224 La. 1014, 71 So.2d 551 (1954).
3. 223 La. 976, 67 So.2d 556 (1953).
4. 225 La. 51, 72 So.2d 257 (1954).
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